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Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
It is well known that the Spanish Monarchy found out some problems in its monetary system. 
So far, almost all the studies have been concentrated in the billon problem and inflation. 
However, small and large silver coins had also problems to circulate together in Castile. 
Without small change, among other consequences, it was more difficult to carry out small 
transactions and without large denominations the credit borrowed by the king to foreign 
bankers was more expensive. These problems were endogenous to the Castilian monetary 
system based on precious metals. Those problems were aggravated with the inflation of 
copper currency and the new war scenario in Flanders during the seventeenth century.  
The Monarchy took decisions against the market in order to avoid those problems. These 
measures did not solve the problems, but they affected the fineness of the currency, the price 
of transactions and the relationship between the Council of Finance and its foreign bankers.  
Theory helps to explain why those problems were intrinsically related to the Castilian 
monetary system. New historical evidence shows that the outcomes of the Crown’s solutions 
to control the number of small coins and to eliminate any premium on large coins are in line 
with predictions of new developments in monetary theory. 
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SPANISH MONARCHY´S MONETARY PROBLEMS IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY: SMALL CHANGE AND FOREIGN CREDIT 
 
“… and the debtors are able to pay their debts using every silver 
coin they want, because the large and the small coins have to be the same 
quality regarding to their fineness and weight. For that, eight coins of one 
reals have the same weight than one coin of eight reals, and four, the same 
than one of four reals, so then, there is no reason to make differences between 
values of those coins”. AGS CJH 632. Consulta del Consejo de Hacienda, 
August 30, 1627. 
Introduction 
Every market needs different sizes of coins for different kind of businesses. Having 
different denominations helps to increase transactions and commerce where cash is a very 
important mechanism to trade. The combination of small and large coins helps to trade 
goods with different values. It would be difficult to buy small amounts or cheap things only 
with large coins, and the same would happen with expensive goods using only small 
denominations. It is necessary to have an equilibrium in the stock of different coins in order 
to get all kind of transactions1. If the process of coinage depends on free choices of people 
and mints, there will be a lot of problems to have enough number of fractional coins 
circulating.  
The circulation of coins with different denominations in monetary systems based on 
precious metals was always problematic, even for coins made with the same metal2. It has 
been observed that money holders prefer to strike high denominations, even when it could 
leave the public with a short of small change3. Each coin has two different values: the 
intrinsic value from the metal used to mint it and the nominal value that the government 
gives up to the coin. Keeping both values together is difficult and it could cause distortions in 
the stock of some groups of coins.  
Another problem is that individuals have different preferences about coins in order to 
use or save them. It increases the value of some coins with respect to others, even though all 
were issued using the same sort of precious metal. Those agents’ preferences modify the rate 
of exchange among them, leaving their official value without effect. The difference between 
legal and unofficial rate could be caused by a higher demand of some coin in the market 
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related to the other one. This process is supposed to be temporal because it would incentive 
people to mint more valuable coins increasing its supply.  
However, if the monetary system is not close and coins can leave the country, then 
the equilibrium will also depend on the demand of “good” coins outside. If that demand is 
larger than the amount minted inside and the coin is exported permanently, the equilibrium 
will never be reached. There will always be a difference between the legal and the unofficial 
rate of exchange.  
Both problems are relevant because they can break the stock of some coins and the 
rate of exchange among them initially established by the government. The Spanish Monarchy 
faced both problems during the seventeenth century and tried to solve them in many 
different ways, not always correctly. It was some kind of experimentation inside of its 
monetary system. 
There is a great debate about the determinants of acceptability among different types 
of money and also about who establish their real market value4. Why a commodity is 
accepted as money? Which are the mechanisms to determine the value of that commodity 
used as money in terms of units of account? It is well known that the basic characteristic of 
any good used as medium of exchange is acceptability to the economy agents. That 
acceptability of a specific asset may depend on several variables reflecting the nature of the 
transaction. The main premise is that some kinds of money were accepted as medium of 
exchange when agents wished to take them as such.  
This paper will argue that the Spanish Monarchy ignored this premise and thought 
that precious metals and its own authority were enough to govern its monetary system. This 
paper shows that the value of coins does not depend only on the legislation but either on the 
intrinsic value of coins. Acceptability and market value of any asset accepted as money will 
come from the conditions of the market and the own preferences of the agents. The big 
mistake of the Spanish Monarchy was to ignore these principles in the seventeenth century. 
Usually, it has been considered that the precious metal was a warranty of stability in 
the old metallic monetary systems in Europe because of the intrinsic value of the metal used 
to mint coins. A bimetallic monetary system might have more problems because the rate of 
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exchange between silver and gold could change as commodities depending on their offer and 
supply. According to this idea, a monometallic monetary system would be a system with a 
higher stability. This paper shows that keeping the official nominal value of coins over time 
could be difficult even within a monometallic monetary system and it caused problems to the 
foreign credit of the Monarchy. 
Theoretical search models of money explain how intrinsic characteristics of money, 
such as durability, kind of metal, homogeneity, etc., might be desirable but are unnecessary 
for a good to fulfill the role of medium of exchange and it is not either the reason for 
maintaining stability among denominations in the market5. 
The paper studies the factors that made the circulation of small silver coins in 
equilibrium with large coins in Castile something very difficult. The problems were not only 
related to the agent’s preferences, but also to the goals of the Monarchy in the credit 
negotiation with its bankers.  
So far, even the huge amount of historical evidences about differences of value among 
denominations in Castile, it has not been calculated yet which was the premium of large 
silver coins over the small change. This paper presents an estimation drawn from a couple of 
different sources. First, a proposal made by the Council of Finance to the king explaining the 
causes of this problem and how to solve it. Second, the records of a private business 
company of Seville that had to buy large coins in order to send several amounts of silver to 
Madrid. Other sources are the discussions inside the Council of Finance about small and 
large coins of silver and the obstacles found to pay foreign bankers with different 
denominations. Members of the government argued that bankers rejected the legal nominal 
value of small silver coins as a strategy to bargain credit with the Monarchy, taking 
advantage of its desperate necessity of financial services in Europe. However, the monetary 
theory and data available in different archives confirm that large coins had a higher value in 
the marketplaces and the banker’s demands about to be paid with large coins were based on 
a real difference among denominations. 
Section I offers a brief description of the Castilian monetary system regarding silver 
coins and different denominations. The monetary model used in this paper to discuss 
problems with small change in Castile is outlined in Section II. Section III describes the 
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problems to have circulation of small silver coins and presents an estimation of large coins’ 
premium. This section uses historical evidence to show how well the assumptions and 
predictions of the model were accomplished in Castile during the seventeenth century. 
Section IV shows the decisions against the market applied by the Monarchy to solve those 
problems, explains why they did not work out and their real effects on the monetary system 
and the credit negotiation. The conclusions of this paper are presented briefly in Section V. 
I. Silver and copper in the monetary system of Castile 
The Catholic Kings settled down the monetary system of Castile in 1497, reforming 
deeply the chaotic medieval system6. The Habsburg dynasty maintained this new system 
almost without changes for more than 200 years7. It was a bimetallic system based upon gold 
and silver. The basic coin for the gold was the ducat, the “real” was the silver unit and the 
abstract unit of account was the “maravedi”. A “real” was 34 maravedis worth and a ducat 
was equivalent to 375 maravedís8. 
The basis of the Spanish system was the Castilian pound, equal to ca. 460 grams, 
divided into 16 ounces. Half a pound of silver - 8 ounces or 230,0465 grams- was called a 
silver mark. This was the unit of weigh for minting gold and silver. The fineness of a silver 
mark before being coined had to be in Castile “11 dineros and 4 granos” (930,555 milésimas). 
This proportion did not change until 1728, when it was reduced to just 11 dineros (916,666 
milésimas).  
A mark of “11 dineros and 4 granos” yielded 67 reales of 3,4335 grams each one. 
However, the owner of the silver only received 64 reales from the mint. A couple of reales 
served to pay the cost of production in the mint (bracceage) and the other one was charged 
by the king (seigniorage)9. The metal brought to the mint to be coined by order of the king 
                                                 
6
 MacKay (1981). 
7
 The more important modification introduced in the 16th century was that King Charles I substituted the escudo for the 
ducado as the basic gold coin in 1537. Garcia de Paso (2000b). 
8
 Hamilton (1983, 1988), Pérez García (1990), Serrano Mangas (1996), Santiago (2000). 
9
 Burzio (1958). pp. 29-35. Veitia y Linaje gives other percentages but the amount received by people after minting the silver 
was the same. According to Veitia, the seigniorage of a mark of silver was 50 maravedís and the cost or bracceage, including 
the “Ensayador” and “Fundidor Mayor” rights was 40,4 maravedis. Veitia y Linaje (1672), Libro I, Capt. XXXIII, n. 13 and 
17. 
6 
was exempted10. There were deviations in the fees collected by different mints because they 
were private businesses and they had to compete in the market to attract clients11. 
The silver coins in circulation were multiples and submultiples of the real (table 1). 
Not all mints coined the same coins, but the Crown tried to keep the equilibrium among all 
denominations because it was necessary for the commercial sector of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the fee charged by the mint was the same weather the owner coined one mark 
of silver into “reales de a ocho” or he preferred “sencillos”. 
 
Table 1. Kinds of silver coins and their value in reales and maravedís. 
Denominación reales maravedís 
real de a ocho, duro, peso fuerte 8 272 
real de a cuatro o “tostón” 4 136 
real de a dos o “peseta” 2 68 
real o sencillo 1 34 
medio real 0.5 17 
cuartillo o cuarto de real 0.25 8.5 
Fuente: Burzio (1956), p. 292. 
 
The purchasing power of each coin was based on its value in terms of maravedis. All 
coins had an equivalent value in units of account, based on its amount of silver. It meant that 
a “real de a ocho” had the same value than four “real de a dos”, or two “reales de a cuatro”, 
because the three cases had the same amount of silver.  
The monetary systems of Castile permitted people choose the moment to melt or mint 
coins. The mints were private and independent business but they operated under 
government regulation. At the beginning of the reign of Philip II (1556) there were eight 
mints in Castile (Seville, Segovia, Toledo, Valladolid, Cuenca, Burgos, Granada and La 
Coruña), although not all of them were continuously active12. A second and very important 
mint was built in Segovia in 1586.  
The nominal and intrinsic values of coins were the variables used by the government 
in order to maintain silver and gold in circulation. When the value of some coin in terms of 
commodities was higher than the value given to the raw silver, people converted precious 
metal into coins, paying the cost of producing them (bracceage) and the taxes charged by the 
king (seigniorage). It allowed the people to increase their purchasing power. On the contrary, 
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if the coins were less estimated in units of account than the raw silver, people preferred to 
melt the coins and to use the raw metal. In this case, the government had to increase the 
nominal value of the silver coins in units of account or to reduce the official amount of silver 
in each coin in order to stop the melt process. 
However, the Monarchy was unable to convince people to mint coins of every size. It 
was observed that mints produced many big coins and very few small ones. The small silver 
coins fell into short supply, causing problems in the marketplaces of Castile. There was a 
great demand of small coins for day-to-day trading.  
The same problem happened in late-medieval Flanders (1334-1484). In terms of the 
proportion of total silver bullion minted, the amounts of petty coins struck were rarely more 
than 1 percent until the mid-fifteenth century13. It was precisely the kind of coins that the 
bulk of the public needed for their daily bread and drink. In Central Europe there was a 
similar reaction when the silver content of small coins was fixed at too high rate in 1559. The 
minting of small coin gradually slackened14. Mexico, a big producer of silver in the world, 
faced a similar problem with small coins and it was necessary to legalize the circulation of 
cacao as coin since 155515. 
To avoid this problem in Castile, the king introduced a coin called billon, made of 
copper and a small part of silver, during the sixteenth century16. This coin had different 
fractions in order to provide enough change to the public. It was an experiment of fiat 
currency in the sixteenth century with the elements of the standard formula defined by 
Cipolla. Almost three hundred years before it had been applied in England. These coins had 
a commodity value lower than their monetary value; their quantity was strictly limited in 
circulation in order to maintain the premium, and the government provided convertibility 
with the rest of currency17. 
The basic billon coin was called “blanca” and it had a nominal value of 0.5 maravedis 
in terms of units of account. Despite of having less silver than the regular silver coins, its 
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purchasing power was the same than them. It was established not only by Castile’s 
legislation but also accepted by the market. The billon was always convertible to silver with 
an exchange rate fixed by the government. It means that sixty-eight “blancas” (34 maravedis) 
were equivalent to a real of silver (34 maravedis). The net profit of producing a blanca was 10 
percent, something very profitable for the Monarchy18.  
The circulation of these coins in the market was not easy. There was alternate periods 
of shortages of copper-silver coins and excessive coining, depending of cost and net gains19. 
Nevertheless, the supply of this sort of coins helped the Castilian markets with the small 
transactions. Merchants and others receiving such billon coins in trade were presumably 
willing to accept them although they had smaller silver content because of their higher utility 
in effecting day-to-day payments. The copper coins suffered several changes but they 
continued having similar proportions of silver and copper until 159620. 
However, given the high net profits that the coinage of billon had for the Monarchy, 
Philip III decided to eliminate the silver from the billon coinage and to produce large 
amounts of them in order to increase his revenues. Since then, its circulation grew very 
quickly. It sent silver currency off the domestic monetary circulation and silver got a 
premium in terms of cooper coins21. Since 1625, each time a person wanted to buy something 
with copper coins, she had to pay an unofficial percentage more if its price was fixed on 
silver because of the different market value of both kinds of coins.  
The damage caused by this effect in the monetary system of Castile during the 
seventeenth century is well known22. As a consequence, people lost its confidence about the 
billon coins that were working like small coins in the markets. Given the uncertainty about 
their value in the future, people preferred to be paid with silver coins or assets convertibly on 
silver. It caused again the necessity of new small coins. But minting silver was a free decision. 
Did people will to mint raw silver into small silver coins in Castile? 
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II. A monetary model 
Recently, Sargent and Velde have developed a model that permit to analyze the 
problems faced by a monetary authority in order to get small and large coins23. They use this 
model, among other subjects, to explain the Castile’s problem with copper coins. Their 
research shows how billon worked and its own limits, and also why the solutions adopted by 
the Monarchy to keep silver value in terms of copper coins were useless.  
This paper will try to show that the same model is also very useful to understand 
Castile’s problems with circulation of small silver coins and how these problems affected the 
credit negotiation between the Monarchy and its bankers. A problem that the members of the 
Spanish Monarchy Councils were not able to understand, it became now something easy to 
explain.  
The model assumes several features that were accomplished by Castile’s monetary 
system during the sixteenth and seventeenth century: 
1.Coins are made of some valuable metal: silver or gold. The government decides the 
amount of metal that each coin contains (b).  
2.Coins circulate by “tale” not by weight. This means that the prices of goods are 
posted in number of coins per good, rather than units of silver weight per good. A coin can 
buy more goods than would the silver within the coin. 
3.The metal content of coins puts an upper bound on the price level (number of coins 
per consumption good), because although coins can be worth more than the intrinsic value of 
the silver they contain, they cannot be worth less. People can costless melt the coins to 
retrieve the silver. The price level p must obey: 
p ≤ y. 
y = units of metal weight per good/units of metal weight per coin. 
 4. There is an unlimited minting in which citizens are free to purchase coins for silver 
at the mint at a set price of coins per unit metal. For example, for each ounce of silver, the 
mint offered (1-S)/b coins.  
The unlimited coinage regime of Castile put a lower and upper bound on the price 
level. If the price level were to fall bellow ‘p’, people had the incentive to bring precious 
metal to the mint to purchase coins, which would increase the stock of coins. If the price were 
10 
strictly between “coining point” (left) and “melting point” (right), the stock of coins would 
not change. There would be neither melting nor minting of coins. By making the range 
narrow, a commodity money system links the price level to the relative price of consumption 
goods in terms of metal. 
   “coining point”   “melting point” 
  y1(1-S1) < ey2(1-S2)  < p <  y1< ey2     (1) 
Table 2. Variables. 
Variable Meaning Units 
b1 Intrinsic content of small coin oz silver/ small coin 
b2 Intrinsic content of big coin oz silver/ big coin 
y1 Nominal value of small coin small coin/ consumer good 
y2 Nominal value of big coin big coin/ consumer good 
S Cost and seigniorage rate   
e Exchange rate small coin/big coin 
p Price of consumer goods small coin/consumer good 
 
For the conversion of bullion into coin can never be costless, and can be undertaken 
only so long as the current coin commands a premium over bullion sufficient to cover those 
minting costs. Normally coins of all denominations will command such a premium, because 
transacting trade and effecting payments is so much more convenient in legal tender coin 
than in raw bullion, which necessarily has to be assayed and weighed to ascertain its market 
value. If that premium ever fell bellow the sum of brassage and seignorage, bullion would 
cease to flow to the mint: requiring the prince either to reduce the mintage fees or to increase 
the trade value of bullion, and thus the coinage premium by a debasement24. 
 In this system different denominations of coins are perfect substitutes. Because coins 
do not pay nominal interest, denominations have identical rates of return if the exchange 
rates (e) among them are constant over time.  
 However, it did not mean that the market is always going to accept it. Actually, 
people had preferences about different denominations and it was reflected in shortages of the 
best one. The reason was that not all denominations bear identical rates of return, even 
though they have equivalents amount of precious metals, so some of them would present an 
advantage to holding rather than the other. The Sargent and Velde’s model predicts 
shortages of small coins when their rates of return are less than large ones, dissolving 
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people’s indifference about denominations25. The market manages a shortage by giving a 
low return to small coins temporarily, producing a permanent effect on ‘e’. It was called 
unofficial “premium”. 
 The silver premium related to the copper currency was caused by the uncertainty 
about its value as consequence of continuous changes, melting and coining process, while the 
premium of large silver coins regarding to the small ones was related with the higher value 
that large coins had in the market because of their multiple uses. For example, they were the 
preferred coins to export silver to Europe.  
III. Small and large silver coins in Castile: problems for the market and also for 
the Monarchy 
 Small and large coins had different uses in the market and a different cost when they 
were minted in the mint. The Spanish Monarchy had problems to incentive the production of 
small silver coins in Castile. The Council of Finance noted many times that small coins were 
avoided and the mints did not produce an enough number of them.  
 Merchants complained about the shortage of small coins frequently because it did 
harder to buy and sell things of small value or quantity. People’s daily life and the 
development of markets depended on having enough means of payment. Credit could help 
to reduce the lack of small coins but it had other kind of problems and higher transaction 
costs.  
 At the same time, the convenience of increasing the number of small silver coins was 
not only seen as something useful for small transactions. True or not, the Council of Finance 
was convinced that it could also help to stop the exports of silver out of Castile: 
“… the currency, how much divided it is in small coins, more profitable is for 
the kingdom and more difficult to exit the country, because a “real de a ocho” 
only can have a holder, but if this coin is minted in “sencillos” could be hold 
by eight persons, and if it would be done in “medios reales”, then by sixteen, 
and everybody would receive benefits for it. Moreover, it makes much difficult 
to collect silver in order to bring it out from the kingdom. V.Mj. knows how 
important is to retain silver in the kingdom as much as possible, doing 
everything we can to get it”26 
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 Scarcity was not the only problem of small silver coins in Castile. They had a different 
rate of exchange (‘e’) that the rate established by the Monarchy. The large types of silver 
coins, also called “plata doble” (table 3), were more valuable than the small ones. The market 
gave a premium to the large coins, showing its estimation, similar to the premium over the 
billon27. It had to be paid when people made transactions where large coins were required in 
the payment. The contracts set up the value of a transaction in maravedis and also specified 
what kind of silver coin had to be used to pay it.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Denomination of silver coins in the contracts 
Name of coin reals size 
peso, real de a ocho, duro, peso fuerte 8 “plata doble” or “gruesa” large 
real de a cuatro o “tostón” 4 “plata doble” or “gruesa” large 
real de a dos o “peseta” 2 “sencilla” small 
real o sencillo 1 “sencilla” small 
medio real 0.5 “sencilla” small 
cuartillo o cuarto de real 0.25 “sencilla” small 
Problems to mint small silver coins 
The Sargent and Velde’s model shows that it is very difficult to avoid misalignments 
in the equation (1), even reducing to zero the production cost and seigniorage taxes (both 
included in S) (table 2). Production cost per coin depends on the kind and size minted. 
Evidently, the small coins (coin 1) are more expensive to manufacture than large ones (coin 
2), because they take much labor and time to strike in the mint, then S1 > S2, and the 
conclusion is that the intervals cannot coincide.  
 When S1 > S2, if the monetary authority aligns the right limits in the equation (1) by 
setting ey2=y1, it implies ey2(1-S2) > y1(1-S1). This inequality implies that the small 
denomination will not be minted. This was exactly that was happening in Castile during the 
period of time this paper studies. The law established that ey2=y1, where ‘e’ was a constant 
rate of exchange between small silver coins and large ones or the mint equivalence, e=y1/y2. 
This constant rate of exchange depended exclusively on the amount of silver of both coins. 
It means that the purchasing power of both coins, small and large, were the same, 
independently of their denomination, it was only based on the amount of silver inside each 
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coin. A “peso de a ocho” or a “real de a ocho” had the same amount of silver than four coins 
of two “reales”, or two coins of four “reales”. Then, the purchasing power had to be the same 
for the three groups of coins. 
 However, people realized that the cost of minting coins was different, depending on 
their size. Minting small coins was more expensive rather than large coins because, at least, it 
demanded more time and work28. According to Grierson, “twelve times as much labor was 
involved in making 12 pennies as in making one shilling” in the structure of the English 
medieval coinage29.  For that reason, they did not have an incentive to mint small coins 
paying more when they would get the same value with the large ones. If people did not pay 
the extra cost of issuing small coins, the mint had to pay it.  
 The Crown could raise the cost of minting big coins to match the cost of small ones. In 
this case, the Monarchy and the mint will be more interested in minting big ones because it 
would increase their revenues from bracceage and segnoirage. However, the government’s 
ability to set minting costs, S2, above its real production costs would have limits. It would be 
the price charged by other countries. If the cost was too high, it would incentive people to 
coin silver in another country. 
 In order to avoid this effect, the Spanish Monarchy could not increase the cost of S2 
too much, but then, the mint had to pay the extra cost of producing small coins in case they 
had to be minted. It encouraged mints to avoid small coins. Historical data show that this 
was the way addressed by the Spanish Monarchy. It would explain why the majority of silver 
was permanently minted in large coins, and why the small silver coins were always very 
scarce in Castile. For example, Hamilton asserts: “It was more convenient for the mint 
workers to coin reales of large denomination instead of the small ones. They obtained more 
profits issuing a coin of eight reales than “sencillos” (one real), because the mint prices were 
the same for a mark of silver, independently the kind of coins produced”30.  
 To control the preferences of the silver owners or the mints, the Spanish Monarchy 
decided to issue laws fixing the amounts of coins that the mint had to issue for each 
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denomination. The same as the Monarchy set up the tale characteristics of the coins, also 
assigned to the mints the proportion of each kind of coin31. For example, in 1588 the Council 
of Finance found out that the mints only minted big coins: “reales de a ocho” and “reales de a 
cuatro”. That same year, Philip II ordered to the mints that the private silver have to be 
issued by 50 percent in “reales de a dos”, 40 percent in “sencillos”, and the rest 10 percent in 
“medios”32. It is suppose that the Crown reserved only by itself the right to issue big coins. 
Of course, mints did not accomplish this law, leaving the market without small change. 
 Other different way to solve this problem is debasing the small coin (raising 
y1=nominal value of coin 1) or reducing the amount of silver in each small coin, ‘b1’, while 
maintaining unchanged its nominal value. If the increase of ‘y1’ is large enough to overcome 
the effect of a more expensive cost of producing small coins, then it will be profitable to mint 
them. 
ey2(1-S2) < y1(1-S1) < p < y1 < ey2 
 The Spanish Monarchy used this mechanism during the sixteenth century introducing 
the cooper and silver coin in order to have a permanent stock of small-value coins. The new 
coin contained a small amount of silver and great proportion of copper, while it kept the 
same nominal value that the rest of silver coins33. People accepted the nominal value of these 
new coins helping the market to have currency for small transactions. The problem with the 
small silver coins was not solved and they continued being very scare, but the new billon 
coin served to fill the gap of small coins in the markets. 
 Nevertheless, this solution was ineffective when the Spanish Monarchy started to use 
this new currency to increase its revenues during the seventeenth century. In order to get all 
the possible revenue the Crown minted copper coins without any amount of silver and also 
reducing its weight. When the 100 percent copper currency invaded the market, people 
rejected those coins, demanding silver coins or increasing prices of commodities to avoid the 
copper inflation. Since the 1620s, this inflation during the first years of Philip IV’s reign 
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provoked a huge uncertainty about the real value of copper coins and it also affected small 
transactions.  
The value overrated of “plata doble” in the market 
 Markets preferred large coins not only because they had lower costs in the mint, but 
also because people gave them a higher value with regard to small denominations. There are 
several reasons to explain why big coins were so attractive. One of the most important was 
that bankers used bigger denominations to export silver in order to pay their correspondents 
in Europe after having lent money to the king.  
 Bankers and merchants were engaged in larger-scale forms of trade and finance in 
Europe. It is suppose that their monetary demands and money-changers would be highly 
biased in favor of larger denomination coins, specially when the higher denomination coins 
had a much wider circulation in international markets. The costs of manipulate and count big 
coins was less than the small ones. It permitted to pay big sums easily. Moreover, it avoided 
the wear or deterioration experienced by small coins. 
 Many historical evidences show how bankers distinguished very well between 
different coins when they sent money to Genoa or Flanders. The letters to their 
correspondents do not only included values but different kind of coins that they were 
transferring34. 
 At the same time, the Monarchy maintained a hard discipline in the monetary system 
that rejected any change in the weight and fineness of silver coins. It caused an increasing 
international prestige of his currency, especially the “real de a ocho”. Many countries 
imitated this coin and its fame spread through the world. Given its high value in Europe and 
in the rest of the world, bankers and their correspondents had another good reason to want 
these sort of coins instead of any other35.  
 The overestimated value that markets gave to large silver coins caused an increase in 
their rate of exchange (‘e’) with small coins, initially established by the Monarchy. Legally, ‘e’ 
depended only on the amount of silver that each coin had (e=y1/y2). But the market 
increased that value and did it variable over time. That implied that  
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ey2 > y1 
which sets the melt point for small coins bellow that for large, allowing price levels that cause 
small coins to disappear. But also cause a change in the intervals of minting. 
ey2(1-S2) > y1(1-S1) 
 The inequality implies that the small denomination coin 1 will not be minted, 
although the Crown pays the higher cost of issuing small coins in the mint, establishing a real 
equal cost, S1=S2. The increase of the rate of exchange gave now by the market get worse the 
scarcity problem of small coins, because now not only the cost of minting small coins was 
higher, but people gave them less value than large coins. Both effects are strong incentives to 
mint only large coins. 
 This effect had an immediate consequence in the Monarchy’s budget. Their expenses, 
especially outside Castile, were paid using foreign bankers´ credit. Bankers wanted to be 
paid with large coins or to be compensated when they received small ones. From the 
Crown’s point of view, a silver debt in Europe expressed in Castilian maravedis had to be 
paid with silver in Castile, but the sort of coins used to do it was something indifferent.  
 It does not have sense to pay an extra compensation when royal officials gave up 
small silver coins because it means to increase the amount of silver paid or to increase the 
debt. In that case, it could be more profitable for the Monarchy to pay its debts with raw 
silver instead of doing it with coins, or at least with small ones. The only inconvenient was 
that the Crown would lose the seigniorage if the bankers exported the raw silver without 
being minted in Castile36.  
 This higher estimation of “plata doble” increased the price of all credit contracts 
signed by the Spanish Monarchy automatically whenever the King paid with small coins. 
The Council of Finance could not control that increase because it depended on the market 
expectations about large coins. Given the growing and permanent deficit faced by the 
Spanish Monarchy during the seventeenth century, it was expected that the Council of 
Finance had to do something to eliminate this problem. However, to take a decision was not 
so easy. Why? 
                                                 
36 In 1621 the Council of Finance paid the bankers with raw American silver deposited in the Casa de la Contratación of 
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 If the Crown decided to link the official value of ‘e’ to the amount of silver in each 
coin (e=y1/y2), then people had an incentive to buy small coins with big ones in the black 
market, using the real value of ‘e’, then to melt the small coins to get the raw metal and after 
going to the mint to produce new big coins, using in this case the official value of ‘e’. 
Repeating this process many times could threat the stock of small coins. 
 Another bad consequence for the Crown was that people would prefer to pay their 
taxes and debts using small coins because the public gained a profit in the difference between 
the ‘e’ from open market and the legal or official ‘e’. However, the Crown would have to pay 
its bankers with big ones anyway.  
Which was the premium of large silver coins or “plata doble” in Castile? 
 The preferences for large silver coins are present in many economic documents of 
Castile during the seventeenth century. The contracts distinguished between “plata doble” 
and “sencilla” currency: large coins and small change.  
 For example, when the Monarchy reached an agreement with the Portuguese bankers 
in August of 1626, the Council of Finance promised to pay 100.000 ducats with “plata doble”. 
The revenues from the first “Donativo” would provide that amount. The contract signed by 
the bankers specified that if they were paid with billon coins, the Crown had to give them an 
extra amount to compensate not only the premium necessary to buy silver coins, but also to 
buy large silver coins or “plata doble”37. 
 The “plata doble” is not only cited in the asientos, the big credit contracts signed by 
the Monarchy and its most important bankers, it is also possible to find in small and private 
contracts. For instance, the insurance policy of a ship bought in Madrid in 1625 notes that the 
beneficiary might be paid with “plata doble”38. Another example is the sale of a title of 
public debt. The buyer, a resident from Avila, was obligated to pay the price with “reales of 
Castilian plata doble, with the same weight, mixture and value” that they had when the 
contract was signed up, “in spite of the pragmaticas and laws that there are o there will be” 
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against the premium of large coins39. In case the buyer could not pay with that kind of 
currency, the seller had the right to cancel the transaction immediately. 
 The Council of Finance estimated that the premium of large coins in the marketplace 
was about 4 or 5 per cent in 1627 and the damages that it was causing to the Crown40. The 
President of the Council of Finance explained it to Philip IV in these terms: 
“I, the Contador Mayor, showed to V. Mjd. (the king) the damage caused to 
the kingdom when the market value of currency coined as one real (1 real) or 
medium reales (0,5 real) is not the same than the “doble” (8 and 4 reales), 
being their weight and finesses. And the convenience of forbidding contracts 
made with equal “plata doble” and the premium that it is necessary to pay 
when they are accomplished with “sencilla”. V. Mjd might avoid signing 
more contracts distinguishing size of coins for all his expenses and in all his 
contracts. The whole currency has to be considered just the same”41. 
 
 A second source for calculating this premium used in this paper is a private 
document with information about some businesses carried out by a Genoese company in 
Seville during 1624 and 1625. These records have permitted to calculate the extra value of 
“plata doble” with respect to small coins in that city. It proves that bankers did not make up 
an artificial extra price when they demanded “plata doble” in their contracts of credit signed 
with the Spanish Monarchy.  
 The partners of this company were Juan Esteban de la Torre y Francisco María 
Pichinotti. Some years later, the second one was among the most important bankers of the 
Monarchy. Bartolomé Spinola, another important Philip IV’s banker, contracted the services 
of this company in Seville during 1624 and 1625 to collect some amounts of money from the 
treasurer’s office of Santa Cruzada in the archbishopric of Seville and in the bishopric of 
Cadiz, and also to do some payments in Seville. Bartolomé was living in Madrid and he had 
not enough time to go to the south to attend these businesses by him. The company charged 
for its work by 0.33 per cent of the total amount collected from the treasurer’s offices. 
Table 4.  Expenses incurred by the company “Juan Esteban de la Torre y Francisco M. Pichinotti”. (maravedis) 
Concept Percentage Silver Copper 
Payment to Vicenço Squarciafico 83,4% 6.000.000   
Transport of money 1,2% 15.130 77.824 
Exchange of coins 2,8% 206.332   
Bulls of Toledo in 1625 12,5% 900.000   
                                                 
39
 AHPNM 4511, p. 64. Venta de juro, March 22, 1625. 
40
 AGS CJH 632. Consulta, August 30, 1627. 
41
 AGS CJH 632. Consulta, August 30, 1627. 
19 
Other expenses 0,1% 4.624 3.026 
Total 100% 7.126.086 80.850 
Source: AHPNM Protocolo 4511, escritura 19/9/1625 
 
 The records of this company show movements in the account of Bartolome’ business 
between March 1624 and August 1625. The expenses of the company during this time were 
7.126.086 maravedis of silver and 80.850 maravedis of billon (table 4). The bigger part of this 
amount, 83,4 percent, was given up to Vicencio Squarzafigo, another king’s banker too. The 
second important expense, a 12,5 percent, was the postage and packing of Cruzada bulls in 
order to sell them in Toledo during 1625.  
 Among all the expenses is the cost of exchange 252.724 reales of small silver coins into 
large ones. It was 206.332 maravedis: 2,4 percent of the total value exchanged and 2,8 percent 
of the total expenses of the company in this period of time (table 4 and 5).  
Table 5. Exchanges of small coins into large coins. (Silver) 
Date of exchange Reales Rate Cost (reales) Cost (maravedis) 
No date 9.000 5% 450 15.300 
September 1, 1624 74.453 3% 2.233,5 75.942 
March 24, 1625 80.900 2% 1.618 55.012 
June 16, 1625 88.371 2% 1.767 60.078 
Total 252.724   6.068,5 206.332 
Source: AHPNM Protocolo 4511, escritura 19/9/1625 
 
 Sources neither specify why the company decided to exchange one silver coins for 
others nor the total percentage exchanged from the total amount collected from Santa 
Cruzada. One reason could be that some part of the payments in Seville had to be done with 
large coins. For example, the Cruzada bulls sent to Toledo cost 900.000 maravedis of silver, 
676.314 maravedis were paid with small reales and 223.686 maravedis using “plata doble”. 
The account shows that some part of large coins was sent to Madrid. Perhaps, other incentive 
to exchange silver coins was that Bartolomé needed large ones in the court and Seville was 
the place more convenient to do it.   
 The money arrived to Madrid by bills of exchange and messengers. The bills declared 
what kind of coins were used to buy them because the payer of the bill was obligated to 
return in Madrid the same currency that he had received in Seville. The company “De la 
Torre-Pichinotti” bought those bills of exchange to the company “Agustin Centurion and 
Francisco Serra”, who paid a total of 68.500 reales in Madrid, 8.500 of them using large coins. 
 Table 5 shows that the cost of exchange calculated by the Crown in 1628 was very 
close to the average value in the free market of Seville. This extra cost concerned very 
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seriously to the Council of Finance because it could increase the expenses of the Crown every 
year by the same percentage if the Monarchy did not have large coins available. An average 
extra cost of 2,5 percent over an estimated budget of 5 million ducats in credits every year 
supposed an annual increase of 125.000 ducats. 
IV. Solutions against the market applied by the Monarchy to solve its monetary 
problems.  
 The Crown tried to find a solution for both problems: the scarcity of small coins and 
overvalue of large ones. The measures that were adopted by the Spanish Monarchy show its 
ignorance about how its own monetary system worked and its blind confidence that the 
market would accept any law issued to regulate prices against the market rules. Historical 
evidence show that markets reacted against those measures as the model presented in 
Section II had predicted.  
 In case of scarcity of small coins, the Crown had two choices: first, leaving people free 
to choose what sort of coin they want to mint. It implied to reduce the amount of small silver 
coins. But it could bring out other problems with the bankers because during some time there 
will be small coins with different amount of silver in the market.  
 Avoiding any change in the intrinsic amount of silver within coins would led to a 
permanent scarcity of small coins and change in the markets. The second choice was to forbid 
any premium between large and small coins by law. The Monarchy preferred the second 
solution even though it was against the market. 
 Regarding to the “plata doble”, the Monarchy did not want to recognize its higher 
value. This posture was very similar to that adopted with the billon42. In that case, the Crown 
established an official rate of exchange between silver and billon far away from its real value, 
forcing people to accepted it. The Monarchy earned money each time that paid debts using 
cooper coins. It was very profitable to sell the silver in the open market using its real price or 
exporting silver metal outside the country, where its value was higher in terms of goods. 
 While, on one hand, the Monarchy enforced the laws forbidding any premium over 
his official rate, on the other hand, the Council of Finance did not fulfill its own laws when it 
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bargained with its bankers to get credits. Simply, the bankers did not accept the legal price of 
silver in terms of billon43. 
The scarcity of small coins: quotas in the mints 
The Crown knew that it was necessary to increase the number of small silver coins in 
marketplaces in order to stop complains from different social groups, and to incentive 
commerce specially when copper coins were causing so many problems to people and to the 
whole Castilian monetary system. The small silver coins could help to increase trade and 
fiscal revenues.  
 At the same time, during the 1620’s some people extended the idea throughout the 
court that increasing the number of small coins would help to end with illegal export of 
silver. Everybody knew that large amounts of coins minted in Seville just after arriving 
American silver in the fleets every year were exported to Europe. In order to increase the 
circulation of small coins, the king established quotas of each coin that have to be coined in 
the mints. 
 The king was owner of a great amount of American silver, but almost the whole 
amount was coined in large coins every year because the bankers had to be paid as soon as 
possible. First, the bankers wanted large coins. Second, minting large coins was faster than 
issuing small ones. Any delayed in the payments had to be compensated with more interests 
and the bankers could stop in providing new credits. Third, the Crown did not want to pay 
the cost of coining small coins, reducing its always-scarce revenues. For all these reasons, the 
king’ silver was exempted of quotas and it continued being minted in “reales de a ocho” and 
“reales de a cuatro”.  
 The Monarchy decided to enforce the quotas in the private sector44. On November 3, 
1626 Philip IV ordered to the mints that all private silver from America had to be minted only 
in small coins. The gold in coins of one escudo, and the silver in three equal parts of “reales 
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de a dos” (2 reales), “sencillos” (1 real) and “medios” (0,5 reales)45. However, the Council of 
Finance realized that it was not so easy to carry out this kind of laws46.  
 From the beginning, people put many obstacles to obey this law. The Consulate of 
Seville complained about the damage that the merchant community would suffer if all its 
silver were retained in the mint for long time in order to issue only small coins. The mint 
estimated the value of the silver waiting for being coined in three million ducats. Without 
this money was difficult to make business in the city and almost impossible to prepare a new 
fleet to go to America some months later. 
 As it was showed by the Council of Finance, these complains were not totally true 
because there was no reason why everybody had to put his precious metal in the mint of 
Seville. They could deliver the metal among the rest of coin factories in Castile where there 
was no such awaiting amount. The concentration of all silver in only one mint was a form to 
force the king to give them up a license to mint large coins, as the solution to accelerate the 
minting process. Actually, neither the mint, nor people wanted issue the silver in small 
coins47. In this attempt to avoid the law and to put pressure on the king, the “Casa de la 
Contratación” and the Consulate of Seville, the most important commercial institutions of the 
city, worked together. 
 However, the quotas faced a bigger problem related to the bad quality of the coins 
that finally were coined. The Council of Finance noted soon that new small coins had an 
important lack of weight. Royal officials carried out an investigation in the mint of Segovia 
where had been minted one million and a half reales according to the quotas established by 
law. The investigation showed that the three kind of small coins had problems with their 
weight. 
 There was a legal shortage of silver into the coin because it was difficult to get coins 
exactly equal. It was called “flebe”. The same happened if the coin over passed the legal 
weight. In this case, it was called “fuerte”. However, the legal “flebe” allowed was a little bit 
more than 9 maravedis per mark, and the coins minted in Segovia had much more. 
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 The report of the Council of Finance showed that: “The best kind of minted coin that 
was the “sencillos” (1 real) and they have 19 maravedis of “flebe” per mark, which is more 
than the double allowed, and the “medios reales” have 37,75 maravedis per mark, and the 
“reales de a dos” 39,8 maravedis per mark”48. 
 A similar investigation started in Seville to know what was going on there, but the 
authorities of the city put so many obstacles to the royal official in charge that he was not 
able to do almost anything49. Maybe the coins had the same problem of Segovia or perhaps 
the city did not want to mint silver in small coins and they wanted to force the government to 
change its policy of quotas.  
 It was clear that merchants and particulars, helped by the workers of the mint of 
Segovia had compensated the higher cost of minting small coins taking away part of the 
silver in every coin. The reduction on the amount of silver increased ‘y1’ in the equation (1), 
as the model predicts. Then, small change was possible. That missing silver was paying the 
fee charged by the mint when its workers produced small coins. 
 When the Council of Finance asked to a group of bankers why people rejected to mint 
small coins in this way, increasing the value of large coins, the bankers gave two reasons. 
First, the small coins had less size and weight, running out more easily and in less time than 
the big ones. The lost of silver would be so important in few years that there would be a 
noticeable difference between old and new small coins.  
 The second reason was that a smaller coin, the “medio real” (0,5 reales) was 
equivalent to 17 maravedis and because there were not coins of one maravedí for change, it 
had to be spent like 16 maravedis, losing one. It meant to give up 6 percent of its nominal 
value. 
 In their opinion, even if the Crown insisted on increasing the stock of small coins, as 
the law had obligated to mint all private silver arrived from America, it would not have any 
effect over the process of exporting silver to Europe. On one hand, because the main reason 
why the silver went out Castile was the money borrowed to the bankers by the king in 
Castile in order to provide funds in other cities of Europe. It must be paid there with silver 
anyway. On the other hand, if there were not large coins, then they would have to export 
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small coins. It would be worse for the Monarchy because then, it would be necessary to pay 
for the cost of collecting, counting and for their lower value these coins received in other 
countries. For both reasons, the bankers recommended to the king do not put more obstacles 
to mint silver in large coins as everybody wanted.  
 Realizing the counterproductive that could be to force the coinage of small coins, 
Philip IV decided to relax the law. Two cedulas on September 22 and December 11, 1627 
changed the quotas in the mint to permit people to coin “plata doble”. The new proportion 
was by 50 per cent as “reales de a dos”, by 25 per cent as “reales de a cuatro” and the rest as 
“sencillos”50. 
The prohibition of premium between small coins and “plata doble” 
 Other strategy of the Crown regarding “plata doble” was to deny any premium in the 
value of large coins. Instead of trying to figure out why it was provoked, the Monarchy 
decided to eliminate this problem by law. The new legislation considered illegal any 
reference in the contracts to a different value between small and large coins. The Council of 
Finance established several punishments in case people continued requiring exclusively large 
coins. 
 Philip IV and many of the members in the Council of Finance did not want to 
understand why bankers singled small and large coins out, giving to the large ones an extra 
value. It was hard to accept when all coins had an equivalent intrinsic value in terms of units 
of account51. It was believed that bankers wanted to take advantage of their dealings with the 
Monarchy to increase the price of credit without any reason.  
 The king ordered to the Council of Finance to obligate his bankers to accept all types 
of coins without asking for any premium. After two meetings with the bankers trying to 
convince them to eliminate any difference between large and small coins, the proposal was 
completely rejected. According to the bankers, the high price of large coins was given for the 
market not for them, and there was no law able to avoid it. Any law trying to do it would be 
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useless “with the essential, although it could seem useful apparently”52. It meant that if the 
premium were not permitted openly, the real different value among coins would have to be 
paid in other many different ways. 
 For example, if every coin had the same legal value, debtors always would chose to 
pay with small coins because there was a real difference in the value. And about the cost of 
the asientos, any attempt to avoid different values between small and large silver coins, it 
would be reflected in the final cost of credit. If the king did not want to recognize a premium, 
he would have to pay a higher price in the asientos.  
 The bankers in Castile had to accept the rate of exchange established by their 
correspondents in Europe, and that price decided the final price of the asientos. So, it was the 
same to pay a premium for large coins or paying an extra cost in the rate of exchange. The 
only difference was that negotiations would be more complicate, because using small coins 
would delay transfers of money to Europe, and large coins would disappear faster from the 
Castile’s monetary system. It would be necessary to find them in the black market with more 
inconveniences and costs.  
 The prohibition was established in spite of banker’s arguments. However, the 
Monarchy made same exceptions very soon. Months later, Bartolome Spinola, the Factor 
General del rey, a kind of Minister of Finance, got help from the Council of Finance to sell 
vasallos, one of the ways set up by the Crown that year to increase its revenues. Bartolomé 
wanted to force buyers to pay with “plata doble” “in spite of the law that forbade it”. He 
wanted to suspend the law “in this case, keeping it in the rest of cases”53. The Council 
accepted this exception. 
 Other example, the asientos of the Monarchy for the next years continued having 
clauses where it was specified the sort of currency that has to be used to compensate bankers, 
doing a clear reference to “plata doble”. Octavio Centurión accepted to provide 800.000 
ducats in 1630 and the Council of Finance promised to pay him with large coins54. There are 
many examples like this one. 
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 Despite of huge historical evidence that the Crown recognized a premium among 
silver coins in Castile, it did not mean that the prohibition was eliminated. In fact, a new law 
was issued against the “plata doble” in 1651. Any royal officials accepting differences in the 
coins would lose their position for four years and be punished with 50.000 maravedis55. 
 This policy adopted with the premium of large coins was exactly the same that it was 
applied to avoid the real premium between silver and billon coins. During many years, the 
Crown maintained a rate of exchange silver/billon far away from its real market value. The 
Crown obligated to regular people to accept the official price when they have to receive 
money from the king, but this official premium was not enforced whenever the Council of 
Finance bargained with its bankers because it would have blocked any credit negotiation. In 
this case, the many times the king paid the premium established by the market.  
V. Conclusions 
 The inflation of copper coins without any amount of silver in the monetary system 
represented a huge problem for the monetary system of Castile during the seventeenth 
century, but it was not the only one. Circulation of silver coins had its own problems, 
independently from the invasion of low quality copper coins. In order to understand them, it 
is necessary to study how the monetary system worked. 
 Circulation of coins with different nominal values was always something very 
complicated in any monetary system based on precious metals. The coins in those systems 
had two different values at the same time: the intrinsic value from the metal which price is 
regulated in the open market like other commodities, and the nominal value given to the coin 
by the government. Differences inside the country in both values give the incentive to melt 
more coins and sell the metal like other commodities or to increase the coining process. On 
the other hand, if there are different values between the country and their neighbors, it could 
push the coins or the metal in or out of their territory. This is a hard problem for the 
monetary system and also for the economy because it can break the equilibrium in the stock 
of coins continuously. 
 The first problem studied in this paper was the scarcity of small silver coins in 
circulation. This problem was solved during the sixteenth century introducing the billon, a 
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group of coins made with copper and a small amount of silver. The advantage of introducing 
this type of coin lay in its role as fiat money. Its nominal value would be always higher than 
its intrinsic value, so it will not allow small change to disappear as it happened with small 
silver coins. Then, the market could use them for small transactions.  
 However, when the king of Spain used these coins to increase his revenues in the 
seventeenth century, eliminating the silver, reducing their weight and increasing their 
amount, markets rejected their nominal value. People lost its confidence in this sort of money 
and the real value of copper currency became very unstable. Markets started to reject them 
because of their high uncertainty. The role played by the billon coins during the sixteenth 
century in Castile did not work anymore. 
 It had a direct consequence in everyday transactions and in the whole Castilian 
economy, doing more difficult to trade, especially goods of small value. Since the 1620s, the 
Spanish Monarchy realized that in order to replace billon coins as small change in 
marketplaces was necessary to increase the amount of small silver coins in circulation. 
Ignoring it, the Monarchy could only expect a reduction of its fiscal revenues, because the 
majority of them were collected from trade using indirect taxes. 
 The second problem studied in this paper was the Monarchy’s problems to get a 
regular circulation of small and large silver coins, especially when the Monarchy did not 
recognize that both types of coins had different values, even though they could have 
equivalents amount of silver. Historical evidence shows that the different denominations of 
silver coins received different real and nominal values in the open market of Castile. The 
paper shows that large silver coins cost between 2 and 5 per cent more than small change. 
Many contracts presented the value of the transaction in unit of account (maravedis) and 
they also specified the kind of coins that the debtor had to use in order to pay.  
 It had an important impact on the revenues of the Monarchy when bankers did not 
want to accept small silver coins at their official rate of exchange and they asked for large 
ones. It meant an increase in the cost of its credit in terms of silver. The Monarchy had to pay 
more amount of silver when payments were done with small coins. Actually, it could be 
better for the king to pay with raw silver. The drawback in this case was that the Crown 
could lose the seignorage from coining the silver in Castile.  
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 The Spanish Monarchy faced both problems when the war started in Flanders in 1621. 
The Spanish Monarchy needed to increase its revenues in Castile and to reduce the price of 
credit. To avoid problems in its monetary system, the king and his Council of Finance tried to 
find the fastest and cheapest solution. But, because they did not understand or they did not 
want to figure out the mechanisms of a bimetallic monetary system, their solutions did not 
solve the problems. 
 Sargent and Velde´s model shows that in order to increase the number of small silver 
coins in circulation, it is necessary to devaluate them, reducing their weight or fineness, while 
their purchasing power was maintained. Other way to do the same could be to increase their 
nominal value without changing their quality in terms of silver. These measures would have 
implied to establish a rate of exchange among denominations independent from their 
intrinsic amount of silver within each coin, but linked to their value in units of account. Small 
change would be more like fiat money even though it has been coined with precious metal. 
The Spanish Monarchy was not prepared to accept the rules of small change in a 
metallic monetary system and the king of Spain was not also prepared to use fiat money in a 
responsible way during the seventeenth century. Fiscal problems in Castile, deficit budgets, 
suspension of payments and expensive wars did not allow the Monarchy to keep its 
monetary system outside of its attempts to increase revenues. 
 The Spanish Monarchy established equal nominal value in term of units of account 
between large and small silver coins, according their intrinsic amounts of silver. Markets 
changed the rate of exchange for them, increasing the value of large coins, not because they 
had more or less silver, but because they had a higher demand in the marketplaces. 
 Because of the Spanish Monarchy did not want to devaluate any of them, the 
solutions applied by the Council of Finance were to force people to mint small coins in order 
to get enough small change, and to set up laws to eliminate any kind of premium on large 
coins. Great fees and punishments were also established to enforce these laws.  
 The outcome of this policy was the same predicted by the model used in this paper. 
First, when the mints were forced to issue more small silver coins, coins were coined with 
less silver than it was allowed. To avoid this dangerous consequence on the quality of the 
Castilian currency, the king had to revoke his law few months later, permitting the owners of 
silver to issue large coins too.  
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 Second, when the Crown forbade the “plata doble” in the contracts and also any 
premium between large and small silver coins, there were more problems to borrow silver 
credits from foreign bankers. These agents warned to the Council of Finance that any law 
against the premium would increase the price of their financial services in Europe and it 
would do more difficult the negotiations. 
 To avoid this effect and any other problems with the bankers, the Crown adopted the 
same strategy used when it had to bargain with them about the premium of copper coins. 
The strong legislation against any kind of premium was enforced when the Crown had to 
pay any debt or its creditor was not a very important agent, but the same legislation was 
forgotten when the king was the creditor or its creditor was a foreign banker. In fact, many 
asientos and even private contracts continued forcing the king to pay with large silver coins. 
If the royal officials did not have enough, they used raw silver to avoid conflicts about the 
real value of small silver coins.  
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